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We  examine properties of risk measures that can be considered to be in line with some 
'best practice' rules in insurance, based on solvency margins.  We give  ample motivation 
that all economic aspects related to an insurance portfolio should be considered in the def-
inition of a risk measure.  As a  consequence,  conditions arise for  comparison as well as for 
addition of risk measures.  We demonstrate that imposing properties that are generally valid 
for  risk measures, in all possible dependency structures, based on the difference of the risk 
and the solvency margin, though providing opportunities to derive nice mathematical re-
sults,  violate best practice rules.  We  show that so-called coherent risk measures lead to 
problems.  In particular we  consider an exponential risk measure related to a discrete ruin 
model, depending on the initial surplus, the desired ruin probability and the risk distribution. 
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1 random variable X  and price p leads to a minimal distance equal to Var[X]' which is obtained 
when the price is p =  E[X].  Our starting point is that a risk measure should take into account 
the economic situation.  Indeed after having distributed the available economic capital there 
still will be a residual risk which is  measured by a risk measure depending on the risk X  and 
the economic capital at hand.  The only stringent restriction that is  needed is  that the total 
available economic capital has to be equal to the sum of the economic capitals. This is different 
from the additivity property of the measures  themselves.  In case  addition of risk measures 
is  possible  (even without properties in the framework  of additivity),  the optimal choice  can 
be formulated in a mathematical way as a minimization problem.  In the approach of Panjer 
(2001),  the risk measure coincides with the economic  capital, which  ensures that additivity 
evolves as a consequence of the defined expectations.  The unrealistic ideal might be to have a 
risk measure that is additive and moreover, invariant for  all possible hierarchical subdivisions. 
Then expectations will be the only answer to the problem. We are a bit reluctant to require this 
additivity property for the following reason. The problem is related to an heritage problem. As 
a grandparent, does one want to be fair towards one's childeren or towards the grandchildren? 
This is  a  decision problem but it is clear that both criteria give distinct solutions.  TI:anslated 
to the problem of allocation of economic or risk capital the problem is  also to some extent 
strategic.  How does one distribute the liabilities in e.g.  juridical entities considered to have 
comparable risk measures?  The question is whether at the moment of the further splitting of 
a subcompany the liability remains with the subcompany, or with the splitted companies.  If 
the liability remains on the level of the original subcompany consisting of two  newly formed 
companies, then of course the risk capital for  the other subcompanies at the higher level is 
unchanged.  When the risk attitude towards the former subcompanies and the newly splitted 
companies, hence supposed at the same hierarchical level, is the same, a reallocation is needed. 
If  one buys a new company, must the economic capital be reallocated? We do not exclude that 
the risk of the mother company is calculated by the same principle, e.g.  an Esscher transform 
or a stop loss premium. In conclusion:  we think that a distinction has to be made between how 
the capital is allocated and the risk measure on which this allocation is based, and that the risk 
measure has to be minimized.  The optimal solution is the desired capital allocation. 
In this paper we will derive an answer to the real problem concerned with the addition of risks. 
The situation of having bounds for the total risk based on the risk measures for the individual 
risks is different if one considers a situation with incomplete dependence information or the case 
of known dependence.  This is  also related to the level on which risk measures are compared. 
Indeed the regulators will only use marginal data of the different juridical companies in adding 
risk measures, while within a conglomerate use can be made of some dependence measures (say 
correlations).  Hence the realistic question is  what can be said about the comparison of the 
sum of risk measures and the risk measure of the sum and how it can provide information for 
decision makers.  In what sense has addition of risks  meaning?  In contrast with a  pure risk 
measure  (compare with measuring a  central tendency combined with the spread)  which is  a 
TRM one also has to consider a solvency risk measure (compare with measuring a tail property) 
where a ORM is needed. 
In conclusion, we  think that a  viable risk measure has to be defined for  each of the daughter 
companies, that can be added.  This measure  of course has to take into account  all the risk 
characteristics, the total claim size X, the premium income 7r,  the economic capital u  as well 
as  the corresponding ruin probability c.  This  risk measure p(X,  7r, u, c)  might  even have an 
appropriate definition for each daughter company, depending e.g.  on the branches and the lines 
3 of business.  If the risk measures can be added,  the optimal allocation of economic capital is 
obtained by solving 
Minimize  ~Pj(Xj,1fj,Uj,E:)  over  Ul, ... ,Un  with  ~Ui  = u. 
j 
This result should be compared with Pm (Xl + ... + X n, 1fl + ... +  1f n, Ul + ... +  Un, E:),  the risk 
measure for the mother company. 
2  Risk measures 
Let us consider first the case of ORM. Because the order :Sstis in essence the same as order with 
probability one, see e.g.  Kaas et al.  (2001,  Ch.  10.2), one might impose the requirement that 
'good' risk measures should satisfy the following property: 
X  :Sst Y =}  p(X) :S p(Y)  (1) 
Even if X  and Yare regarded as  'net gains',  i.e.  payments minus premiums, X  :Sst  Y  still 
does not imply Var[X] :S Var[Y], nor O"(X)  :S O"(Y).  From this it follows that neither Var[X] 
nor O"(X)  is  acceptable as  a  risk measure.  This might be true for  the ORM case,  because a 
variance is indeed a two-sided measure. But subadditivity is often substantiated by pointing at 
properties of the standard deviation, because O"(Xl + X2)  :S O"(Xr) + 0"(X2)' with equality only 
if the correlation equals +  l. 
Note that X  :Sst  Y  together with E[X] =  E[Y]  means that X  rv Y.  Stop-loss order, hence 
E[(X - t)+] :S E[(Y - t)+] for  allreal t, together with equal means E[X] =  E[Y] is equivalent 
to X  :Sex  Y  (convex order), see e.g.  Kaas et  al.  (2001,  Ch.  10.6).  Consequently certainly for 
ORM, respecting convex order must be an important criterion. In what follows, we will develop 
arguments indicating that imposing general axioms valid for  all risky situations conflicts with 
generally accepted  properties for  dealing with  particular sets of risks,  based on what could 
be called as  'best practice' rules.  We will show that pure risk measures should possess other 
properties than measures developed for solvency purposes. 
Some examples are examined to support this assertion. 
Example 1:  In earthquake risk insurance, it is  better, in the sense that a  lower total price 
is possible, to insure two independent risks than two positively dependent risks, like two 
buildings in the same area.  For insuring both buildings,  the premium should be more 
than twice the premium for insuring only a single building.  The exchange of portions of 
life portfolios between different continents such as one sometimes encounters in practice 
is another example illustrating the importance of a geographical spread of risks in order 
to make them more independent.  As  a consequence, we  see that imposing subadditivity 
1f[X + Y]  :S 1f[X] +  1f[Yj  for all risks (including dependent risks) is not in line with what 
could be called 'best practice'. 
In the framework of risk measures,  it is  also  clear that percentiles or related measures 
do not catch the risky character of a risk in an economically sensible way.  This simply 
means that when the Value At Risk is used to measure risk, it makes for instance no sense 
to consider subadditivity. This notion arises from the contamination with the problem of 
supervision, where the supervisor or a rating agency wants to end up with an upper bound 
4 for  the integrated risk of several portfolios.  In that situation it would be nice to have a 
measure for  insolvency risk that can be obtained by adding the measures for  each of the 
portfolios, or that this procedure provides an upper bound for  it. 
Example 2:  Consider a combined risk (payments)  distributed uniformly on (0,1).  The 90% 
percentile equals 0.9.  By the percentile criterion at the level  10%, this random variable 
is just as dangerous as the one which is uniformly distributed on (0,0.9) U (9.9,10).  So 
a tail characteristic like  the VAR by itself is not a  good risk measure and is  not in line 
with best practice rules.  By using the VAR as a criterion, one implicitly assumes that the 
distributions to be compared are of a similar type, for  instance a normal distribution. 
It should be remarked that the conditional expectation, e.g.  above the 90%  percentile, does 
make a distinction between the two situations in Example 2.  Example 1 indicates that seri-
ous problems may arise from assuming sub  additivity.  Clearly, subadditivity is  not desirable in 
case dependence aspects of the risks are important.  Premium principles satisfying the proper-
ties of (sub-) additivity were restricted to independent risks.  Risk measures should cope with 
dependencies as well as with tails. 
Example 3:  In the case of a translation invariant risk measure the problem of allocation of 
economic capital does not play a role in judging the safety of a  financial conglomerate. 
Indeed suppose the economic capital is u =  U1 +U2+ ...  +un. Then we have to compare the 
conglomerate risk measured as Pcongl(X1 +  .. .  +Xn -u) with the sum of the company risks 
P1 (Xl -U1)+ .. ·+Pn(Xn -Un). Cohrence of a risk measures implies translation invariance, 
so this boils down to comparing Pcongl(X1 + ... +  Xn) - u with P1 (Xl) + ... +  Pn(Xn) - u, 
meaning that the way in which we allocate the economic capital is irrelevant.  Apparently 
all work done nowadays on capital allocation assumes incoherent risk measures. 
Example 4:  Also the property of positive homogeneity is not always desirable, because it cor-
responds to linear utility.  In this case, a rational decision maker will not accept that risk 
is linear function of scale.  For a risk neutral decision maker this may hold, but it certainly 
is  not valid in insurance. 
A  problem not to be confused with the problem of defining  a  risk  measure for  a set of risks 
consists in the determination of a measure for  insolvency risk.  This problem originates from a 
very practical situation where within a financial conglomerate one wants one figure to summarize 
the risks of a set of different (possibly) dependent subcompanies. The same problem arises in case 
we consider one financial and/or insurance institution with different portfolios or business lines. 
Here the final aim is related but different from the aim of determining a risk measure.  For each 
of the separate subcompanies (dependent or not) one can derive a measure for the insolvency risk 
based on the relevant statistical material that comes from within the subcompany (hence only 
marginal statistical data are used).  Here the question arises whether the sum of the measures 
of insolvency for  the individual subcompanies gives  an upper bound of the risk  measure for 
the sum of risks  contained in the financial  conglomerate.  This may resemble the concept of 
subadditivity but in reality it is  not the same. It is a problem of finding the best upper bound 
for the measure of insolvency of the sum of risks for which we know a measure of insolvency for 
each of the individual companies (marginally).  This is directly related to the following question: 
if a financial conglomerate has a risk based capital available that amounts to u then how can one 
5 distribute this amount over the subcompanies in such a way that the total measure of insolvency 
is  known, only based on the measures of insolvency risk of each of the separate companies. 
We consider some other examples indicating the danger of imposing general properties for mea-
sures of insolvency risk. 
Example 5:  Sometimes bankruptcy risk,  where some argue that society requires less  capital 
from a group without firewalls, is introduced to motivate sub  additivity of pure risk mea-
sures.  One should however not confuse risk-free reserves with the notion of a risk capitaL 
Indeed large companies generally have larger free  reserves,  however large companies will 
look even more professionally towards their needed risk based capital, because there is a 
price to be paid for  it.  As  seen in the recent  aviation disasters it is  clear that it is  an 
advantage to have a large firm broken into subcompanies, meaning that the corresponding 
risk measures should reflect this.  Even bankruptcy in company A immediately gives that 
no loss is left for the conglomerate which otherwise would have been carried by the global 
company.  This perhaps is  a question of corporate governance. 
Example 6:  Consider a  uniform risk X  in the interval (9,10)  and compare it with a  risk Y 
that is  20  with certainty.  Clearly Pr[X < Y]  = 1 but in X  - E[X]  there might be a 
risk of insolvency, while Y - E[Y]  represents no risk at all.  Hence, a risk measure should 
incorporate a  component reflecting the mean of the risk,  or any other central tendency 
characteristic. Suppose a company splits its risk X  as XI+  X R where XI is the retained risk 
while XR is the reinsured part. If  one has sub  additivity, then p(XI+XR) ::;  p(XI)+p(XR). 
Because the safety loading for  a  tail result like  XR  =  (X - r)+ tends to be relatively 
high, for the reinsurer's risk measure we  often will have PR(XR) > p(XR),  and it follows 
that no  reinsurance will  be  bought, since  it will  be considered too expensive.  In case 
p(XI+XR) ~ p(XI)+p(XR) it is possible that p(XI+XR) ~ p(XI)+PR(XR),  and these 
are the reinsurance treaties that exist.  There should be a relation between the expected 
gain and the remaining risk.  The expected gain has to be seen in relationship with the 
change in riskiness. 
Example 7:  The condition of subadditivity, p(X  +  Y) ::;  p(X)+p(Y), for a translation invariant 
risk measure can be rewritten as p(X +  Y - p(Y)) ::;  p(X). This can be interpreted in the 
following way.  Suppose the risk measure is derived from an insurance premium principle. 
Then adding more risks to an existing portfolio is  always advantageous, no matter what 
the dependency structure between the risks is.  Now consider 0 ::;  p(X) ::;  1 for a Bernoulli 
risk with Pr (B = 0)  = 1 - q = 1 - Pr (B = 1).  Consider the sum of n  such risks which 
are assumed to be comonotonic. Then the new surplus equals u +  n p(X) with probability 
1 - q and u +  n  p(X) - n with probability q.  From this it follows that for n large enough, 
the probability of getting ruined by adding risks equals q,  which might be high, and from 
a solvency point of view, adding risks does not necessarily reduce the risk. 
Note that translation invariance implies that p(X - p(X)) = O.  Hence,  a very insolvent 
situation might occur, unless p(X) = max (X). 
Example 8: It is  immediately clear, see e.g.  Goovaerts et al.  (1984), that the risk measures 
E[X]  and .Max[X]  both satisfy the properties  of coherence,  see  Artzner  (1999),  hence 
p(X) ::;  p(Y) if Pr[X ::;  Y]  = 1,  p(aX + b)  = ap(X) + b for  all a  ~ 0 and all b,  as  well 
as p(X + Y)  ::;  p(X) + p(Y)  for  any X  and Y.  As  premium principles, both are useless 
6 in practice, since the latter violates the no rip-off condition and is useless for  unbounded 
risks like exponential or Pareto risks,  while the former does  not involve a  risk loading, 
hence leads to ruin with certainty in a ruin process, and also makes no distinction between 
a  risk and the increased risk arising when its distribution has been subjected to a 'mean 
preserving spread' in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971). 
Example 9:  An interpretation of the solvency margin based on an economic reasoning could be 
obtained as follows.  The price of reducing the total risk is the sum of the risk measure of 
the remaining risk added to the cost of the available capital to be paid to the shareholders  .. 
For instance in case one transfers the risk by a stop-loss insurance with a loaded premium, 
the cost is (1 +a)E[(X -u)+l +iD u. In this particular case, the optimal capital, minimiz-
ing the total cost, can be shown to be given by u = Fx1(1 - iD/(1 +  a)). In this example 
we get as a risk measure a particular quantile, where the probability is not arbitrary but 
can be determined from economic parameters. 
Example 10:  Expanding on the previous example, consider a risk business facing a loss  X  at 
the end of a particular period. The economic capital is K  at the beginning of the period, 
growing to K(l + r)  at the end.  Assume that the capital K  has to be borrowed against 
an interest i.  To minimize the cost of capital iK, K  should be as small as possible, but 
to minimize the insolvency risk E[(X - K(1 + r))+l, K  should be large.  Just like in the 
previous example, we have to minimize the total cost 
E[(X - K(l +r))+l +iK. 
Note that a stop-loss premium can be expressed as follows 
E[(X - d)+l  =  ('XJ [1- Fx(x)ldx.  ./d 
(2) 
(3) 
To account for  the riskiness  of the tail,  we  use  a  distortion function 9  with g(O)  = 0, 
g(l) = 1, g(x) increasing and g(x) ;::: x.  See, e.g., Wang (1996).  Then we can compute the 
'cost of avoiding insolvency' by 
roo g(1 - Fx(x))dx. 
./d 
Therefore we minimize 
roo  g(l- Fx(x))dx+iK. 
./K(1+r) 
The optimal solution is given by 





Assuming  l~r =  0.1,  without distortion, hence with g(x)  ==  x, the optimal end-of-year 
retention K(l + r)  equals the 90% percentile of X, but assuming g(O.Ol)  = 0.1, it is  the 
99% percentile.  Hence, the optimal threshold depends on i  and on the way that we  blow 
up the tail. It should be noted that the percentile is not the risk measure, but in fact it is 
the value of K  corresponding to the (minimized) total cost. 
7 3  A  risk measure based on exponential premiums 
Consider the discrete time ruin model for insuring a certain portfolio of risks.  We have a surplus 
Ut at time t which increases because of collected premiums c and decreases in the event of claims, 
the total of which is  St in year t, leading to the model studied by Biihlmann (1985), see  also 
Kaas et al.  (2001, Ch.  5): 
Ut = Ut-l +c-St  t = 1,2, ...  (7) 
Ruin occurs if Ut  < 0 for some t.  We  assume that the annual total claims St,  t  =  1,2, ... 
are independent and identically distributed, say St '" S, with S - c having positive mean but, 
to make things interesting, also positive probability of being negative.  We suppose that S  has 
exponentially bounded tails, hence that the moment generating function exists to the right of 
the origin.  The case of heavy tails could be handled by the same method, using another bound 
for the ruin probability.  The initial question that arises is how large the initial capital Uo = u 
and the premium c =  7r(S),  that shall be used as a risk measure p(S), should be for ruin not 
to occur with a  sufficiently high probability.  In e.g.  Kaas  et  al.  (2001,  eh.  4)  it is  shown 
that the probability of ruin is  bounded from  above  by e-Ru  where R  denotes the so-called 
adjustment coefficient, which is the positive root of the equation eRe = E[eRS)  or equivalently 
of c =  1ilogE[eRS).  Hence, we  get a ruin probability of at most e when R  =  ~Ilogel.  The 
corresponding premium to be asked is 
1 
7r(S) = p(S) =  c = R  logE[eRs).  (8) 
In the framework of insurance, the premium (8)  clearly is an adequate risk measure.  Since for 
the exponential utility functions _e-<>w with risk aversion a > 0 , the utility preserving premium 
can be shown to be i log E [e<>X),  the adjustment coefficient can be interpreted as the degree of 
risk aversion that leads to the actual premium c being in fact the correct exponential premium. 
Such exponential premiums have been thoroughly studied by actuaries. 
This ruin consistent risk measure (8) satisfies the following properties, as can easily be verified. 
1.  In case Sand T  are independent one gets p(S +  T) = p(S) + p(T); 
2.  If  S  :Sex T, then p(S) S  p(T); 
3.  p is invariant for a proportional change in monetary units; 
4.  p(S + T) S  p(SO +TO) whenever (SO, TO)  is 'more related' than (S, T), with equality only 
if (S, T) and (SO, TO)  have the same joint cd£. 
A pair of random variables is defined to be 'more related' than another with the same marginals if 
the probability of simultaneously obtaining small values, hence the joint cdf, is uniformly larger, 
see e.g.  the textbook Kaas et al.  (2001, Section 10.6).  Comonotonicity is the extreme case when 
this joint cdf equals an upper bound for  it;  for  a review of its properties and applications, see 
Dhaene et al.  (2002a,  2002b).  It can be shown that S +  T  :Sex  So + TO  is  valid.  Translated 
to the discrete time ruin model above, if the yearly results Si  and Tt"  would be PQD (positive 
quadrant dependent, i.e., more related than in case of independence), the risk, measured as that 
exponential premium such that the ruin probability with initial capital 11  has the same bound 
8 c,  is larger than when the results are independent.  From the first and last properties it follows 
that p(SO) + p(T")  ~  p(SO +  TO)  if (SO, TO)  is PQD; note that So  and T" cannot be degenerate 
in the discrete time ruin model. 
Remark:  We  have  argued that considering the pure variance as  a  risk  measure seems  in 
principle  wrong.  Taking the initial capital into  account  is  vital.  One could  argue that by 
summing p( S) +  p(T) and asking for subadditivity an economic principle is respected, but this is 
not the case in general, because accepting both risks, seen as marginal risks, might in reality be 
accepting SC+Tc and for addition to be meaningful, p(sc+TC) =  p(S) +p(T) must hold, hence 
we would have to impose additivity as a desirable property.  This problem has been considered 
by Wang (1996).  From this it is  certain that, a priori,  addition of risk in principle does not 
make sense.  Only after  having constructed a  risk measure one might verify  whether it has 
nice properties.  From the example above one sees that additivity should perhaps be required 
for  comonotonic risks,  but then of course it does not hold for  risks that are not comonotonic. 
Any risk measure which is additive for  arbitrary pairs of risks attaches the same risk to S +  T 
in all three situations that Sand T  form a complete hedge  (correlation -1), are independent 
(correlation 0)  or are completely dependent (correlation +1), which is, to put it mildly, counter-
intuitive.  Any model that implies such additivity has requirements that are too strict. 
3.1  Optimal asset allocation in case of marginal information 
The situation that marginal information is available generally occurs when we consider the point 
of view of the regulating authority.  We now have the following  problem of allocation of eco-
nomic capital.  Assume that a conglomerate (or insurance regulator) is faced with a total risk 
S = Sl +S2+ .. ,+Sn, having an economic capital U = U1 +U2+ ...  +un to be distributed among 
the daughter companies.  Then the question arises if, even with an exponential principle that is 
not subadditive, we  can determine a subdivision U1, ... ,Un  such that the risk measure of the 
conglomerate is smaller than the sum of risk measures of each of the daughter companies. This 
has nothing to do with the additivity property of the risk measures themselves since indepen-
dence is required no longer. From an economic point of view the splitting of the conglomerate in 
different subcompanies should increase the total amount of risk, because problems arise as soon 
as one subcompany is ruined, while within the integrated conglomerate compensations between 
the companies still may avoid  ruin.  On the other hand the dangerous dependence should be 
measured too. If  a risk measure gives a lower sum of risks for the different daughter companies 
than for  the complete conglomerate, this risk measure should not be acceptable, but this has 
nothing to do with the mathematical property of subaddidivity of risk measures.  Even for the 
exponential premium, which is  not subadditive because if (X",  YO)  is PQD, the premium for 
X" +  Y" is larger than the sum of the individual premiums, we get: 
Theorem:  If ±  =  ~, +  ~2 + ... + ,L, then 
9 Proof. For the proof,  we  refer  to Gerber (1979);  it can also  be found in Section 5.6  of the 
textbook Kaas et al.  (2001). 
Hence,  even in case a  TRM risk  measure has p(XC + YC)  ::;  p(X) + p(Y)  and hence  is  well 
adapted to determine premiums, one obtains for the allocation problem (in principle requiring a 
ORM) an upper bound for the total risk.  This is the realistic situation, which is independent of 
the subadditivity property of the pure risk measure.  The optimal economic capital allocation is 
the one obtained by minimizing I:i t log E[e"'iSi]  where i =  I:i t. In terms ofthe distributed 
capital the problem can be formulated as: 
Minimize ~  1l:~cllogE [exp  CI~clxi)] over all Ui with 2:= Ui =  u.  (9) 
The solution can be obtained by means of the Lagrange method. With the notation 
!logelx_ 
i  E[Xie  Ui  '] 
PEss(Xi ) =  ~x 
E[e  Ui  i] 
(10) 
which are exponential and Esscher premiums for  Xi  respectively, both with parameter  1 1::01, 
the optimal solution satisfies the following system of equations 
(11) 
Hence choosing the Ui in this way,  the total risk measure of the conglomerate is under control 
using only the marginal information of the different daughter companies. 
Recall that the Esscher premium for  S  with parameter h > 0 equals E[SehS]/E[ehS] = ""(h), 
where ",(t) =  logms(t) is the cumulant generating function.  The exponential premium in case 
of risk aversion h is just i",(h).  Since "'(t)  =  E[S]t + Var[S]~ + G(t3)  for  small t,  for  large 
values of the capitals Uj,  hence small values of the parameters  11:: 01  for  the Esscher and the 
exponential premiums, solution (11)  can be written in the following form: 
Uj  ~  Var  [XJli (2uj) 
-;; ~ I:i Var[Xi]/(2ui)" 
(12) 
Hence, the optimal capital to allocate to daughter j  is approximately proportional to the safety 
loading contained in the exponential  (and Esscher)  premium to be asked incase the capital is 
optimally allocated. 
3.2  Optimal asset allocation in case of multinormal distributions 
We  now  study the situation of  capital  allocation  as  considered  by  Panjer  (2001),  where  he 
assumed that the joint distribution of Sl, 52, ... ,Sn is  multivariate normal with given mean 
and variance-covariance structure.  He bases his  reasoning on the tail var for  calculating the 
allocation of capital: 
Uj =  E[S:i IS> Xq],  (13) 
10 where Xq  is the q-percentile and S =  I:  Si.  In many practical situations Xq  will not arise as 
a  percentile, but is just a given capital u, from which q  follows.  This way of distributing the 
economic capital can be justified by making use of the following conditional risk measure.  Let 
p(S) =  E[(S - u)t] =  qE[(S - u)2 IS> u]  (14) 
Because he considers u as a q-quantile, we  have 1 - Fs(u)  =  q and hence by conditioning,  a 
quadratic loss function results.  The conditioning is introduced because a quadratic loss function 
gives  a  TRM in case  the expectation is  calculated.  While essentially the capital  allocation' 
problem should be solved by means of a ORM, the conditioning is essential.  The advantage in 
Panjer's approach consists in the easy way in which (14)  can be calculated analytically for the 
multinormal situation. Using the same conditioning for the daughter companies, the sum of the 
risk measures then equals (after dividing by q) 
LE[(Si - Ui)21 S > u]  (15) 
where we take I:  Ui  = u.  Unfortunately we are not able to cope with the danger that arises due 
to the dependencies in case we  add together Sl +  S2 + ... +  Sn  basing ourselves on the above 
risk measures, since p(S,u) s:  I:p(Si,Ui) is not necessarily true.  In addition, p(S)  cannot be 
expressed in monetary units.  We are only in the position to optimize (15) with respect to the Ui, 
which of course makes sense, too. By the method of Lagrange multipliers, optimal Ul, U2, ... ,Un 
are obtained as the solution of the set of equations: 
E[Si - Ui IS>  u]  =  A  (16) 
Adding up all these equations we get 
nA =  E[S - U IS>  U]  (17) 
such that 
1 
Uj = E[Sj IS> u]- -E[(S - u) IS>  u]. 
n 
(18) 
This result can also be written as 
U  {  1  }  Uj = ;, +  E[Sj IS>  u]  - ;,E[S IS>  u]  .  (19) 
We might replace the condition S > u by S > t for t =  FS1(q)  but still requiring I:Ui =  u. We 
get the same solution, only with the conditioning event S > u replaced by S > t.  Then in the 
special case that U  =  E[S IS> t],  we get Panjer's (2001)  result: 
l~i = E[Si IS> t].  (20) 
Remarks: 
l. In principle the  results  are  based  on  a  quadratic loss  function,  which  is  questionable. 
There are other loss functions that provide a  ORM, necessary because economic capital 
allocation is  a one-tail problem.  After redistributing the economic capital, the remaining 
risk is  related to the right end tail. 
11 2.  The disadvantage of the present situation is that although one minimizes the sum of risk 
measures based on the marginal risks,  the final  situation is  not a  guarantee for  having 
a  risk measure for  the global conglomerate which  is  an upper bound of the risk.  This 
has nothing to do with the additivity (or not) property of the risk measure based on loss 
functions. 
3.  The advantage of the approach by Panjer, using multinormal 81, ...  , 8n ,  lies in the fact 
that in the multivariate normal case the dependencies can be taken into account. 
4  Risk measures based on convex order 
We  already noted that when comparing random variables X  and Y  having the same mean 
E[X] =  E[Y], stochastic ordering is not relevant. As a next step, we consider convex order, where 
X  :Scx Y if E[(X  -t)+] :s E[(Y  -t)+] holds for all real t, as well as E[X] = E[Y]. As being convex 
larger denotes increased risk, a desirable property is clearly that X  :Scx Y  =? p(X) :s p(Y).  A 
risk measure is called comonotonicity consistent if 
p(X1 + ... +Xn) :s p(Xl + ... +X~)  (21) 
For example, risk measures that can be written as  E[4>(X)]  for  some convex function  4>  are 
comonotonicity consistent,  as  is  any risk measure that respects convex order, hence has the 
property X  :Scx Y =*  p(X) :s p(Y). 
4.1  Optimal allocation in case of marginal information for a  comonotonicity 
consistent risk measure 
Assume that the total solvency risk of a conglomerate Xl +X2 +  ...  +Xn with n subcompanies is 
measured by E[ (Xl +  X2 +  ... +  Xn -d)+] where in principle all dependencies between the random 
variables Xl,  X2, ... , Xn are possible.  This risk measure is used in examining the subcompanies 
from a  global point of view.  On the other hand for  company j  we  consider as a risk measure 
also E[(Xj - d)+].  In this way,  we  order risks within the subcompanies  also by means of a 
risk measure respecting comonotone ordering. It is clear that addition of risk measures, hence 
comparing E[(L;j Xj - d)+]  and L;j E[(Xj - d)+],  makes no sense here, indeed for  a suitable 
choice of d,  E[(Xj - d)+]  could be close to 0 for  all j, while E[(L;jXj - d)+]  might be quite 
largethe pure comparison of makes no sense. 
For any convex function 4>(.),  the risk measures E[4>(X)], E[4>(X - d)]  and E[¢ ((X - d)+)]  are 
comonotonicity consistent.  But the question remains how we can introduce realistic addition of 
risk measures of this special type.  This is done by interpreting d as the economic capital.  This, 
and that is the only importance of talking about subadditivity of risk measures, can be achieved 
by the capital to be allocated. Indeed the problem that arises is the distribution of u among the 




since the inequality between the random variables on both sides in fact holds with probability 
one. This indicates that a risk measure, a ORM in particular, has to be related to other economic 
variables than just the pure risk variable. Indeed the available capital is an important parameter. 
Now the last inequality has to be approached from two sides.  Indeed we can consider: 
12 Problem A: 
n 
Minimize  '2...::E[(Xi -ui)+l  over the Ui  with  U =  LUi 
i=1 
Problem B: 
Maximize  E[(X1 +  X2 + ... +  Xn - u)+l  over the dependency structure 
(23) 
(24) 
In case of marginal information the maximum has to be taken over all possible dependencies 
with these marginal distributions (Fn§chet space, see e.g.  Dhaene et al.,  2002a, 2002b), because 
in case there is no co-operation the only statistics available to the decision maker (the one who 
allocates the economic capital) are the marginal data. Once again it is clear that a subadditivity 
property is  not a necessary requirement for  constructing risk measures.  One should construct 
risk measures that deal with the risk (such as  ruin probability, cost of having insufficient eco-
nomic capital).  From the results on comonotonic risks, see Kaas et al.  (2001, Section 10.6), it 
immediately follows that the solutions of the problem of maximizing the conglomerate risk and 
minimizing the sum of the risks  of the daughter companies,  both give the same value of the 
problems 
E[(Xf + Xi + ... + X;; - u)+l =  LE[(Xj - FX;1(Fw(u))+], 
j 
(25) 
where FM"/(u)  = I:j  FX1(u).  While the expectation of any convex function gives a risk measure 
which historically has shown its value, this shows that addition of utilities as an axiom is not 
necessarily a realistic manipulation.  In the class of risk measures based on the expectations of 
convex functions E[¢(X)], it can be shown that the only choice of ¢ that leads to an equality 
of the optimal values of both problems A and B is  of stop-loss type.  This result can be found 
in Goovaerts et al.  (2001, Theorem 5). 
4.2  Optimal asset allocation for multivariate normal distributions 
Suppose now we  consider again the situation of Section 3.2 this time using as a risk measure 
peS)  = E[(S - u)+], where S =  S1 + S2 + ... + Sn.  Because the distribution of S is  known 
in the allocation of capital for  companies who cooperate as well as  provide statistics describing 
dependencies, peS)  is cast into the form pes, u) = E[(S - u)Is>u], where Ib  =  1 if the boolean 
expression b is true, 0 otherwise.  For each of the daughter companies we have 
p(Sj, Uj) =  E[(Sj - Uj)+l =  E[(Sj - Uj)+ Is;>u;l  ~  E[(Sj - Uj)+ Is>ul =: Pinj(Sj, Uj) 
(26) 
It follows  from this that,  because we  have  information concerning the dependency structure 
between  the daughter companies  of the conglomerate,  the risk  measure to be considered is 
Pinf(Sj, 'Uj)  [to be interpreted as p(.,.) with additional information] which has the same structure 
as the risk measure of the conglomerate, of course with an adapted economic capital. As before, 
we  have with probability one 
(27) 
13 Multiplying on both sides by Is>u and taking expectations, we get 
(28) 
To  get the best upper bound, we  have to solve the following  problem in the framework of an 
optimal allocation solution: 
Minimize 2::E[(Sj - Uj)+ IS> u]  such that 2::Uj = U  (29) . 
By means of a Lagrange multiplier method one obtains that for each j, 
Pr[Sj > Uj IS> u] = >..  (30) 
The joint distribution of Sj and S can easily be obtained because, writing Pj  =  p(Sj,S) and 
aJ =  Var[Sj]' 
Sj 
S  (31) 
Hence the values Ul, ... ,Un have to be determined as roots of the following system of equations 
lXJ (1 - FSjIS(Uj,x)!s(x))dx =  >'(1- FSj(u))  (32) 
with>' chosen such that Ul +  U2 + ... +  Un = u. 
4.3  Conclusions 
In this paper it is argued that the combination of so-called desirable properties for risk measures 
or insurance  premium principles that have  to hold  for  all  situations, hence for  all  types of 
dependencies simultaneously, often violates what could be called best practice, and sometimes 
leads to inconsistencies. In addition it is shown that risk measures should be added only if this 
is  sensible,  which it is not for  instance when premiums for  the same risks  are compared that 
are quoted by companies with different strategic goals,  for  instance because they admit very 
different ruin probabilities.  As  an example we consider a risk measure describing the economic 
risk, taking into account economic factors as well as the contingent claims, and not depending 
on the difference between the economic capital and the risk variable. This risk measure provides 
a  nice  tool for  determining optimal capital allocation.  The relevance of some  other capital 
allocation  proposals is  investigated.  The importance of considering the remaining risk  after 
allocating the economic capital is stressed. 
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